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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF TI-IE ESTATE 
of 
THOMAS A. BEAL, sometimes 
knovvn as T. A. Beal, Deceased. 
ORSON H. BEAL, et al, 
Respondents' Brief 
, Appeal _from the District Court in and for Salt Lake-
County, State of Utah, 
Honorable Roald A. Hogenson, Judge 
WM. L. BEEZLEY 
Attorney for Respor~:dents. 
Salt Lake City,. Utah. 
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Point l 
We contend that by virtue of the 
express terms and conditione aa con-
tained in Para.grMph Five o£ aiel 
Will, it is not subject to judicial 
construction for the reason that the 
terms and wording are concise ancl 
not ambiguoua 1n any reapect and that 
said terms and the language employed 
leave no doubt whatever &a to the 
. ·- ( ' 
intention ot testator. 4 
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IH THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
of 
THOMAS A. BEAL, sometimes 
known as T. A. Beal, Deceased. 
ORSON H. BEAL, et al, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
MATTIE BEAL HANSEN, et al, 
Respondents. 
Respondents' Brief 
Case No. 
7369 
This is an appeal from the decree of final dis-
tribution heretofore made and entered by the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, in the Estate of Thomas A. Beal, de-
ceased, on June 13, 1 949. 
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The appellants are all of the relatives of the 
full blood of the deceased. The respondents are the 
relatives of the half blood of said deceased, and 
respondents contend that by virtue of Paragraph 
Five, which in effect was stricken from said Will, 
the heirs of the half blood as outlined in the decree 
of distribution shall participate in and to the assets 
of deceased's estate by virtue of the laws of succes-
sion as provided for by the compiled laws of Utah. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Thomas A. Beal, deceased, made his last will 
on J\t1arch 13, 1941. He died on January 3, 1948. 
His \Vife, Ida Peterson Beal, predeceased the death 
of her husband and died on January 6, 1945. The 
Will was admitted to probate and Letters of Admin-
istration with the Will Annexed, in accordance with. 
the terms thereof, were issued to Berdella B. Evans 
on March 20, 1948. In connection with this state-
ment, we refer to the last Will and testament of 
Thomas A. Beal, Deceased, on file herein and make 
the same a part of this statement and particularly 
refer to Paragraph Five thereof, which is as fol-
lows: 
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3 
''Fifth-In the cz•cnt that my wife and I 
shall perish in a commpn catastrophe, or di-
saster, then and in such event, I give, devise, 
and bequeath to the President of the University 
of Utah for the School of Business the sum of 
$500.00, and to the President of Snow College 
for the Sno"v College a like amount, for the pur-
chase of books in Business and Economics, for 
the use and benefit of said schools in building 
up their libraries. And in such case of death, 
I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue 
and remainder of my property, both real and 
personal, of \vhatever kind the same may be, or 
wherever situated, or to which I may be en-
titled, to my nearest of kin and my wife's near-
est of kin. That is to say, to our brothers and 
sisters, of the full blood, share and share alike, 
it being understood that the children of any 
said brother or sister now dead, or who may 
predecease us, shall stand in the place of such 
deceased brother or sister, and take a one-tenth 
interest in the remainder therein devised and 
bC'queathed. Further, in such case, I nominate 
and appoint Carvel Mattsson the Executor of 
my last Will and Testament, to serve without 
bond, and I hereby revoke any and all former 
wills by me made." (Italics ours.) 
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4 
The only issue involved in this matter is whether 
or not the contingency as outlined in Paragraph 
Five of deceased's vVill is a condition precedent and 
failed to occur and by reason of such failure, the 
will as to Paragraph Five is inoperative. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
PorNT 1 
We contend that by virtue of the express terms 
and condition as contained in Paragraph Five of 
said Will, it is not subject to judicial construction 
for the reason that the terms and wording are con-
cise and not ambiguous in any respect and that said 
terms and the language en1ployed leave no doubt 
whatever as to the intention of testator. Section 
101-2-1, Utah Code 1943, reads: 
"A vvill rnust be construed according 
to the intention of the Testator. Where 
his intention cannot have effect to its fullest 
extent, it must have effect as far as pos-
sible." 
Section 101-2-27, Utah Code 1943, reads: 
"If a devisee or legatee dies during 
the' lifetime of the Testator, the testamen-
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tary disposition to him fails unless an in-
tention appears to substitute some other 
in his place except as provided in Section 
101-1-33." 
Section 101-2-30, Utah Code 1943, reads: 
"A condition precedent in a will is one 
which is required to be fulfilled before a 
particular disposition takes effect." 
Section 101-2-31, Utah Code 1943, reads: 
"'vnere a testamentary disposition is 
made upon a condition precedent, nothing 
vests until the condition is fulfilled except 
where such fulfillment is impossible in 
which case the disposition vests unless the 
condition vvas the sole motive thereof and 
the impossibility was unknovvn to the tes-
tator or arose from an unavoidable event 
subsequent to the executio~ of the will." 
The vVill in question is unambiguous, 'clear and 
to the point and raises no question as to the Tes-
tator's intention in the premises. He first directs 
that all of his just debts and funeral expenses be 
paid and that he be buried in accordance with his 
station in life. He then gave and bequeathed to the 
School of Business of the University of Utah his pro-
fessional library but retained therefrom family rec-
ords, books of account, and books of religion. He 
thereaftPr gave and devised the rest of his entire 
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6 
estate to his vvife, Ida Peterson Beal, who thereafter 
predeceased Testator in death and of course, her 
heirs cannot inherit in any event by virtue of the 
Section of the Utah Code above set forth. Thereafter, 
in Paragraph Four of the deceased's Will, he nomi-
nated and appointed his wife as Executrix of his 
Will to act without bond. 
The conditional element in said Will is confined 
to Paragraph Five thereof and it will be noted that 
in said Paragraph the common catastrophe or disas-
ter was referred to specifically four distinct times, 
to-wit: "In the event that my wife and I shall perish 
in a common catastrophe or disaster, then and in 
such event, I give, devise and bequeath ..... And 
in such case of death, I give, devise and bequeath 
..... Further, in such case . .... " (Italics ours.) 
It will be further noted that the deceased be-
queathed unto the University of Utah $500.00 and 
. a like amount to Snow College vvhich bequests were 
also based upon the condition precedent as con-
tained in said Paragraph Five. 
"The power of a Testator to give in-
cludes the right to withhold or to fix the 
terms of a gift no matter how whimsical 
or capricious they may be provided only 
they do not in any way violate the law." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
Holmes vs. Conn. Trust Dep. Co., 
92 Conn. 507, 103 At. 640. 
In re Holbrook, 213 Pa. St. 93, 62 
At. 368. 
"The condition or stipulation so at-
taches to the devise as to become a part 
of it and controls the terms on \Yhich the 
enjoyment of the gift is to take effect or 
be retained." 
Holmes, Supra. 
"The rule that courts favor testacy 
rather than intestacy does not relieve courts 
from obligation to construe language of 
will according to legal effect of words used 
and wills must be construed as written." 
In re Searl's Estate, 186 Pac. 2d 
913 ('Yash.) 
In the case just cited above, the rule is the same 
that the respondents contend for in this cause. In 
the above case, Hon1er I. Searl and Edda Marie 
Searl, \lvere husband and wife. Mrs. Searl made her 
will. She devised and bequeathed to her husband 
her estate, providing: "Ho\vever, in the event my 
husband and I should meet death by accident or 
otherwise at the same time or approximately the 
same time, then it is my desire and will that all such 
residue and remainder- of 1ny estate is to pass to, 
and in the event of such happening, I do give, devise 
anrl bequeath the same unto my sister, Mrs. Anna 
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Florence Conwell, who is now a resident of Colum-
bus, Ohio." 
She appointed her husband as Executor. The 
testatrix died on May 19. 1945; her husband filed 
will for probate in June of said year, and he died 
on July 5, 1945, or 47 days after his wife's death, 
and the Court held that the word "approximately" 
in testatrix' will giving residue to wife's sister if 
husband and wife should die at approximately the 
same time, would be assumed to have been em-
ployed in its customary sense of "nearly," and that 
47 days subsequent was not approximately the same 
time. Therefore, the condition precedent never oc-
cured. 
In the case of Glover vs. Reynolds, 135 N.J.Eq. 
113, 37 At. 2d 90 it was held that "The rule of pre-
sumption against intestacy cannot be used to justify 
a revision of the clear language of a will where will 
giving all Testatrix' property to her husband pro-
vided that 'in the event that my husband and my-
self die simultaneously regardless of the order of 
passing, I give and bequeath my property as therein 
specified' but made no provision for contingency if 
husband predeceased Testatrix and will was inoper-
ative to pass any of wife's estate where husband 
predeceased Testratrix and property passed as in case 
of intestacy." 
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The Court stated: '·By her \vill, th~ testatrix 
appears to have had in mind only two possible sit-
uations; to-·wit: That she \vould predecease her hus-
band or that they \vould die simultaneously, or at 
least contemporaneously. She completely overlooked 
the contingency \vhich did occur. Her failure to an-
ticipate this or in the alternative to execute a new 
will in the four months which intervened between 
the death of her husband and her death cannot now 
be cured. This Court under the guise of construing 
the Will will not write a new one. As has frequently 
been pointed out in our decision, it may be that if 
she could novv express her views, she \lvould wish her 
estate to pass to the defendant beneficiaries but this 
is of no moment here." "In the case of McDonald 
us. Clermont, 107 N.J.Eq. 585, at page 589, 153 At. 
601, 603, the Court of Errors and Appeals adopted 
as its own view the following language of Vice-Chan-
cellor Buchanan: 'He did not say it in his Will and 
this Court cannot say it for him. It is regretful, but 
after all, it is the Testator's own fault. The law froze 
all possible safeguards about the execution of a \vill 
so a man may be sure that his property will go in 
accordance \Yith what he provides in his will; but the 
law cannot, or at least does not, compel a man to 
have his will drawn by someone who knovvs how'." 
It will be noted that the terms of Paragraph 
Five herein of Deceased's Will that nothing appears 
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to the effect that the contingency as stated merely 
is the reason for making the will that the devises 
and bequests are based solely upon the contingency 
named therein. 
In the Matter of Porter, L.R. 2 P. & D. 22, 23, 
cited in Note 71, 68 C.J. 631, where the Court 
stated: 
"It is the common feature of wills in 
respect of which this sort of question arises, 
that the testator therein refers to a possible 
impending calamity in connection with his 
will; and the question arises, whether he 
intends to limit the operation of his will to 
the time during which such calamity is im-
minent. If the language used by him can 
be construed to mean that he refers to the 
calamity and the period of time during 
which it may happen as the reason for mak-
ing the will, then the will is not condition-
~!; but if he refers to the calamity or the 
possible occurrence of some event as a rea-
son for a certain disposition of his property, 
and mixed up the disposition with the 
event so that one is dependent on the other, 
then the court must hold the will to be con-
ditional." 
Malter of Porter, Supra. 
It seems very evident that the Testator referred 
to the calamity or the possible occurence of such 
event as a reason for a certain disposition of his prop-
erty, and he mixed up the disposition with the event 
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and that one is dependent upon the other. As must 
be noted in Paragraph Five, based upon such event, 
he named the President of the University of Utah, 
the President of Snow College, and to deceased's 
nearest of kin and his "·ife's nearest of kin. 
The writer respectfully submits that the Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree made 
and entered by the trial court in this matter should 
be upheld and affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WM. L. BEEZLEY, 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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